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In his deeply polemical new book Political Literacy in Composition and Rhetoric: 
Defending Academic Discourse against Postmodern Pluralism (Southern Illinois University 
Press, 2015, pages 197-201 and 223), Donald Lazere discusses my controversial article “IQ and 
Standard English,” which was published in the professional journal College Composition and 
Communication, volume 34 (1983): pages 470-484. 
 
But my controversial 1983 article was a radically shortened version of a far lengthier 
essay that I had been working on for years titled “IQ, Orality, and Literacy.” Why the switch of 
the title for the published version? I switched the title for the published version so that I could 
highlight as one target the official 1974 position paper known as The Students’ Right to Their 
Own Language. This was the official 1974 position paper of the professional organization known 
as the Conference on College Composition and Communication, the organization that sponsors 
the professional journal known as College Composition and Communication. For a recent 
discussion of the issues involved in that 1974 official position paper, see David Mulroy’s book 
The War against Grammar, with a foreword by Charles I. Schuster (Boyton/Cook Publishers/ 
Heinemann, 2003). 
 
Because Lazere in his new book revisits the controversy over my 1983 article “IQ and 
Standard English,” I have decided that the time has come for me to publish the unexpurgated 
lengthy text of “IQ, Orality, and Literacy” so that interested people may see it and, if they wish, 
compare it to the shortened published version titled “IQ and Standard English” (1983). My file 
copy has no date on it. But my guess is that the file copy is a draft of the essay that was typed in 
in 1978 or 1979. 
 
In an unprecedented spurt of creativity, I wrote the first draft of that essay in late 
December 1973, I think, or perhaps in early January 1974, along with two other essays. 
Eventually, all three were published. My former teacher at Saint Louis University, Walter J. 
Ong, S.J. (1912-2003), read all three of those essays in the spring semester of 1974. He helped 
arrange to have one of them published in 1974, and he encouraged me to publish the other two, 
which I eventually did (1975 and 1983). My 1974 article attracted the attention of Mina P. 
Shaughnessy and others associated with the City College of the City University of New York, 
where CUNY’s experiment with open admissions was underway. In the spring of 1975, 
Shaughnessy attended the national meeting of the Conference of College Composition and 
Communication in St. Louis. I myself did not attend that national conference. But she had asked 
me to meet her at that conference hotel, which was a short drive from the open-admissions 
community college in the City of St. Louis where I taught. If you’ve seen Judy Garland in the 
movie Meet Me in St. Louis, then you know that the World’s Fair was in St. Louis in 1904. The 
grounds of the 1904 World’s Fair are known now as Forest Park. The hotel complex where the 
national conference was held is across the street from Forest Park on its eastern perimeter. The 
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open-admissions community college where I taught is across the street, so to speak (two streets 
actually, one a major highway), from its southern perimeter. When I met with Shaughnessy at the 
conference hotel, she asked me if I would come to teach at City College/CUNY. I said yes. She 
single-handedly arranged for me to be invited to teach at City College in 1975-1976. By that 
time, Shaughnessy herself was no longer teaching at City College, because she had taken a 
position as a CUNY administrator at the central administration of CUNY. 
 
I was born in a hospital on the banks of the Hudson River in Ossining, New York, my 
father’s hometown, about 30 miles north of New York City. We had visited my father’s family in 
Ossining more than once. On at least one of those trips, we had visited Manhattan. As a teenager 
I was actually a fan of the New York Yankees; I followed their games by reading newspaper 
accounts of them when we lived in Kansas City, Kansas, my mother’s hometown. Figuratively 
speaking, I kind of thought of living in Manhattan in 1975-1976 as going home. I felt thoroughly 
at home in Manhattan in 1975-1976. For Frank Sinatra, Chicago was his kind of town -- but he 
left his heart in San Francisco. For me, Manhattan was my kind of town. I became an expert in 
using the subway system to get around. Incidentally, speaking of Chicago, I saw the Broadway 
musical by that name. The male lead in that musical lived in a brownstone directly across the 
street from my apartment. Yes, I did talk with him once in front of my apartment building. The 
title of my article “Literacy, the Basics, and All That Jazz” includes the title of one of the clever 
songs from that musical. I also enjoyed zipping up to watch Suzanne Farrell (no relation) dance 
at the New York City Ballet, which was a short subway trip from my apartment. Nevertheless, I 
have enjoyed the tranquility and natural beauty of living in Duluth (from 1987 to the present) – 
on the shore of Lake Superior. Henry Wadsworth Longfellow (1807-1882) writes about Lake 
Superior in his widely known epic poem The Song of Hiawatha (1855).  
 
Now, in the book Hopkins, the Self, and God (University of Toronto Press, 1986), the 
amplified version of Ong’s 1981 Alexander Lectures at the University of Toronto, Ong says, 
“Like all human beings, Gerard Manley Hopkins was a product of his times” (page 7). Like all 
human beings, I am a product of my times, and so are my publications regarding open-
admissions students, including the unexpurgated text of “IQ, Orality, and Literacy” below. But I 
would not be willing to revise the text below or any of my other texts about open-admissions 
students. At the time of their publication, my publications about open-admissions students served 
a constructive purpose by presenting a conceptual framework in which to locate the discussion of 
open-admissions students. My publications are listed at my UMD homepage: 
http://www.d.umn.edu/~tfarrell. 
 
However, my controversial 1983 article and its 1986 sequel address the still crucial issue 
of IQ. Has it been settled yet? Not quite. See Richard J. Hernstein and Charles M. Murray’s 
controversial book The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life (Free 
Press, 1994); Richard E. Nisbet’s book Intelligence and How to Get It: Why Schools and 
Cultures Count (Norton, 2009); and James R. Flynn’s book Are We Getting Smarter? Rising IQ 
in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
 
In all honesty and humility, I still think that I formulated an intelligent hypothesis about 
IQ. Of course my hypothesis may not be correct. That’s why it might be worth testing my 
hypothesis. However, I regret that I did not know anything in the 1970s or the 1980 about Gary 
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Simpkins’ work on readers for reading instruction in elementary education. Had I known about 
his work, I would surely have mentioned it, and I may have even urged the use of the readers that 
he and his co-authors developed, instead of the McGuffey Readers. John Rockford, in linguistics 
at Stanford University, has published some articles about Simpkins’ research and his co-authored 
series of readers.  
 
Now, in ancient Greek the word “polemos” means war, struggle. The word “agon” means 
contest, struggle. In the book The Presence of the Word: Some Prolegomena for Cultural and 
Religious History (Yale University Press, 1967), the expanded version of Ong’s 1964 Terry 
Lectures at Yale’s Divinity School, Ong discusses polemical structures. However, in his later 
book Fighting for Life: Contest, Sexuality, and Consciousness (Cornell University Press, 1981), 
the published version of Ong’s 1979 Messenger Lectures at Cornell University, he switches from 
using the term polemical structures to using the term agonistic structures. In real life, when our 
intensity reaches the point where we are not civil toward somebody with whom we happen to 
disagree, then our tone and perhaps our words may express our incivility in no uncertain terms. 
Figuratively speaking, we act and sound so uncivil that our behavior may strike us and others as 
war-like. Mulroy’s book is aptly, but of course figuratively, titled The War against Grammar 
(2003). 
 
In his book Hopkins, the Self, and God (1986), Ong says, “Hopkins, like [John Henry] 
Newman, had very little if any of the defensiveness which betrays intellectual insecurity and 
freezes the mind” (page 92). Of course Ong may be wrong about that – defensiveness may not 
manifest intellectual insecurity that freezes the mind. But what if he’s right? What if it is the case 
that defensiveness manifests intellectual insecurity that does indeed freeze the mind? Wouldn’t it 
have been wonderful if he had explained how people might overcome their intellectual insecurity 
so that they would no longer be subject to manifesting defensiveness?  
 
Now, in the unexpurgated text below, scanning glitches and typos in the scanned text 
have been cleaned up. Because the text below is basically a historical document, I am publishing 
it here for interested readers to look over if they want to. To this day, I contend that I have 
formulated a testable hypothesis – that is, a hypothesis that can be tested through an experimental 
research design. As I now say, Simpkins’ approach to reading instruction could be used to test 
my hypothesis, but the testing of my hypothesis would have to involve a multi-year longitudinal 
study. 
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Abstract 
 
This report on the how and why of IQ shows that differences 
in the mean IQ scores between black and white children can be 
accounted for -- probably totally -- on a cultural basis. The 
genetic hypothesis of IQ differences can be assuredly rejected 
on the basis of Paul D. McLean's research on the brain. 
Scholarly research generated from this country, primarily by 
Eric A. Havelock and Walter J. Ong, S.J., showed that 
historically abstract reasoning developed as oral cultures were 
transformed by the interiorization of the non-acoustic 
arithmetical and alphabetical symbol systems, and those 
differences in mean IQ scores are concerned precisely with 
abstract reasoning. Tests of mental measurement measure the 
knowledge and abstract reasoning processes of the literate 
culture of Western civilization, and black Americans who live in 
ghetto conditions live in a residual form of a primary oral 
culture. Consequently they have not fully interiorized the non-
acoustic arithmetical and alphabetical symbol systems that are 
integral to the development of higher cognitive functions, and 
empirical statistical research produced in this country, by 
Arthur R. Jensen and Richard A. Figueroa, confirmed this. 
Moreover, the pioneering field work carried out at open 
admission colleges confirmed that black inner-city youth can 
move from orality to literacy. However, two conditions seem to 
be necessary for this to happen. First of all, an 
orally/aurally/visually integrated pedagogy must be employed. 
Secondly, the instruction must proceed in a logical step-by-step 
(or programmed) sequence. Curricular recommendations and 
recommendations for government action are made at the end of 
this report. 
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IQ, Orality, and Literacy 
 
Thomas James Farrell (1973, pp. 30-119) reviewed the 
extensive but inconclusive research findings about educating 
disadvantaged youth who come from a heavily oral culture, and 
Farrell has reported on his field work (1972, 1974, 1975, 1977a, 
1978a, 1978b, 1979) with heavily oral youth in the United States 
of America (USA) who are black and culturally disadvantaged. In 
the present work cognitive development of heavily oral youth is 
the subject of concern, with specific reference to the work of 
Arthur R. Jensen (1969, 1973, 1977, 1978, 1979a, 1979b, and 
Jensen and Figueroa, 1975) on the mean IQ difference between 
black and white youth. The author contends that the difference 
in the mean IQ scores with respect to abstract reasoning between 
black and white youth can be attributed to culturally acquired, 
as distinct from genetic, cognitive differences. The author 
herein describes in detail the historical movement from primary 
oral culture (innocent of reading and writing) to literate 
culture and discusses in particular how literacy is related to 
the development of abstract thinking -- the kind of thinking 
measured by the IQ tests of which Jensen wrote. Since our black 
youth in urban ghettos come from a functionally oral culture, it 
is not surprising that they receive relatively low scores on 
measures of abstract reasoning, for this is the very type of 
reasoning that developed historically as a concomitant of 
literate cultures. Before proceeding to the main argument, a 
definition of the population about which this paper is concerned 
would be helpful, and Walter J. Ong, S.J., wrote a useful 
definition for our present purposes and offered some assessments 
of the author's early work that are worth including here: 
 
The highly oral culture of our black urban ghettos as 
well as of certain isolated black and white rural 
areas is basically a primary oral culture in many 
ways, although it is more or less modified by contact 
with secondary orality today. The orality of non-
ghetto urban populations generally and of suburbia 
generally, white and black, is basically secondary 
orality. As Farrell [1977a] has made clear ... , the 
problems of moving students out of the two kinds of 
orality are not the same. ... Thomas Farrell isolates 
nicely two of the basic problems a person has to face 
in moving from orality into the world of writing. ... 
students make assertions which are totally unsupported 
by reasons, or they make a series of statements which 
lack connection. Farrell notes that such performance is 
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not necessarily an intellectual deficiency but only a 
chirographic deficiency. (Ong, 1978, pp. 4, 3) 
 
As a matter of fact, overcoming the "chirographic deficiency" 
transforms one's cognitive abilities and opens the door to 
further growth in abstract reasoning. By and large, youth in 
secondary oral culture have experienced and interiorized this 
development at a comparatively early age (Jerome Bruner [1978] 
without seeming to be aware of it described just how early 
children begin to be inculcated into the visualist habits of 
literacy in our secondary oral culture, which Ong noted is 
characterized by "literate orality.") 
 
In the spirit of fair play, the author wishes to here call 
the reader's attention to Sylvia Scribner and Michael Cole's 
(1978) critique of Farrell (1977a), Ong (1958, 1971), and Eric 
A. Havelock (1963), whose work also figures largely in the 
present paper. While Scribner and Cole declare their dislike 
forthrightly, the reader should carefully note that 1) they cite 
only two of the many works by Ong that are cited in this paper; 
2) they do not mention Ong's (1967b) major work on orality and 
literacy, which is available in Italian (1970) and French (1971) 
as well as in paperback in English; 3) they cited only one of 
the seven works by Havelock that are cited in this paper (for an 
earlier expression of their animus against Havelock [1963], see 
Cole and Scribner [1974]); 4) they do not manifest familiarity 
with the work of Parry (1971), Lord (1960), Rosenberg (1970), 
Opland (1975), Yates (1966), and the many other works here 
cited. Their apparent lack of first-hand familiarity with the 
work of Francis A. Yates on memory is especially revealing 
because Cole and Scribner (1975) have attempted to 
scientifically investigate memory among primary oral people. 
While their honest and forthright acknowledgement of the limits 
of their attempted investigation is commendable, the author 
wonders if such a misguided attempt at research would have been 
undertaken if they had been familiar with Yates (1966). However, 
while it is beyond the scope of the present paper to discuss 
cross-cultural research in cognitive psychology, the author 
wishes to acknowledge that Cole and Scribner (1974) have 
provided a useful introductory survey of that research and a 
helpful bibliography. Some studies worthy of mention here are 
Heron and Dowel (1974), Kellaghan (1968), Price-Williams (1970), 
Lloyd and Easton (1977), Greenfield and Bruner (1966), Ross and 
Millsom (1970), Scribner (1974), Cole and others (1971), 
Scribner and Cole (1973), Luria (1928), Vygotsky (1929), Luria 
(1971), Luria (1974), Gurova (1971), Sokolov (1971), Sokolov 
(1972), Luria and Yudovich (1959), and the Vygotsky Memorial 
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Issue (1967) of Soviet Psychology as well as the one hundred 
seventy works discussed by Farrell (1973). However, while these 
studies are worthy of mention as sensitive and thoughtful 
explorations, cognitive psychology will not come into its full 
maturity until researchers in the field have digested the works 
cited throughout the remainder of this paper. Specific support 
of that generalization is explicitly spelled out below in 
italics. However, let it be said here that Cole (1978) surely 
argued rightly that while education does change the mind, that 
is not a sufficient reason to justify extended schooling for 
everybody (also see Gross, 1980). 
 
Jensen's Argument 
 
Although Professor Jensen (1973) acknowledged the 
possibility of as-yet-unformulated-and-untested environmental 
explanations of the mean IQ differences between black and white 
youngsters, he (1969) rightly rejected the various environmental 
explanations that have been tested, and he then proposed instead 
that the genetic or hereditary explanation of mean IQ 
differences be reconsidered, which proposal was not unreasonable 
under the circumstances, and which proposal served as a catalyst 
to generate some excellent research (e.g., Jensen and Figueroa, 
1975; Jensen, 1979). In presenting his case, Jensen noted that 
"the Binet-Simon test was commissioned by the Minister of Public 
Instruction in Paris for the explicit purpose of identifying 
children who were likely to fail in school" (1969, p. 6). In 
other words, the Metrical Scale of Intelligence devised in 1905 
was to measure "intelligence" as defined by twentieth-century 
Western schooling, and this seems to be the general orientation 
of all subsequent IQ tests. Jensen recognized as much when he 
approvingly quoted O. D. Duncan as saying, "Had the first IQ 
tests been devised in a hunting culture, 'general intelligence' 
might well have turned out to involve visual acuity and running 
speed, rather than vocabulary and symbol manipulation" (1969, p. 
14). Twentieth-century Western schooling certainly does involve 
vocabulary expansion and symbol manipulation, and it fosters a 
concept of intelligence that might be defined, as Jensen defined 
it, as "a capacity for abstract reasoning and problem solving" 
(1969, p. 19). The problem is that the mean scores of black 
children on measures of conceptual and abstract reasoning are 
substantially lower than the mean scores of white children. It 
appears therefore that black children are not developing the 
very cognitive abilities that schooling presumably fosters. 
Jensen himself offered a sound summary of some of the reasons 
why schooling might not have the effect of inculcating its 
unique form of abstract intelligence in some youngsters:  
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Satisfactory learning occurs under these conditions [of 
schooling] only when children come to school with 
certain prerequisite abilities and skills: an 
attention span long enough to encompass the teachers' 
utterances and demonstrations, the ability voluntarily 
to focus one's attention where it is called for, the 
ability to comprehend verbal utterances and to grasp 
relationships between things and their symbolic 
representations, the ability to inhibit large-muscle 
activity and engage in covert "mental" activity, to 
repeat instruction to oneself, to persist in a task 
until a self-determined standard is attained -- in 
short, the ability to engage in what might be called 
self-instructional activities, without which group 
instruction alone remains ineffectual. (1969, p. 7) 
 
But some of those inner-directed verbal and mental abilities are 
more complex than Jensen may have imagined, and those very 
complexities mean that a greater percentage of black than white 
children apparently do not meet Jensen's pre-conditions for 
effective schooling and as a consequence do not develop the 
abstract reasoning that schooling teaches as well as some of 
their white counterparts do. Jensen's somewhat inner-directed 
pre-conditions are more likely to be present in children from 
the relatively literate backgrounds of secondary oral culture 
and not so likely to be present in children from the more oral 
background of primary oral culture, for literacy even in 
secondary orality inculcates inner-directed behavior, whereas 
primary orality encourages outer-directed behavior that needs to 
be structured to some degree externally. 
 
Jensen (1977, 1978) has also maintained that the study of 
intelligence should be evolutionary, and the evolutionary stages 
of the brain, the seat of intelligence, have been studied in 
recent neurophysiological research, revealing some information 
that is pertinent to the present consideration of intelligence. 
Paul D. MacLean is Chief, Laboratory of Brain Evolution and 
Behavior, USA National Institute of Mental Health, and MacLean 
(1969, 1970, 1973a, 1973b, 1976a, 1976b, 1977, 1978) described 
the brain of the higher mammals as being composed of three types 
of brain which developed through evolutionary processes: 1) the 
reptilian brain (the matrix of the upper brain stem, comprising 
much of the reticular system, midbrain, and basal ganglia); 2) 
the paleomammalian brain (the limbic system, into which all the 
sensory systems feed into the hippocampal formation); and 3) the 
neomammalian brain (the neocortex). He noted that each type of 
brain has its own structure and chemistry. Moreover, each type 
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of brain has its own special form of subjectivity and 
intelligence, which suggests that perhaps each of the three 
types of intelligence should be discussed and measured 
separately. (Intelligence does precede thinking and behavior, 
but tests can measure only that which has been developed.) 
MacLean described the neomammalian brain as the brain of 
reading, writing, and arithmetic -- the brain of abstract 
reasoning. The neomammalian brain is characterized by its nice 
differentiating ability and its propensity to subdivide things 
into smaller and smaller entities. Of course, the "brain 
potential" (and concomitant intelligence) for abstract reasoning 
can be present in people today without being developed to a very 
great extent, just as the potential for abstract reasoning was 
apparently present in humans for thousands of years before it 
was actively developed. 
 
MacLean's work on the structure of the human brain is 
important in the present context for several reasons. First of 
all, if differences in developed (as distinct from potential) 
intelligence were due to genetic differences, the brain would be 
the organic locus of those differences. In effect that would 
mean that the brain structure in blacks is different from the 
brain structure in whites, but the research findings on the 
structure of the human brain do not warrant such a hypothesis 
(in addition to MacLean, see Lenneberg, 1967). Secondly, Jensen 
(1973; Jensen and Figueroa, 1975) conceded finding no 
significant differences between blacks and whites on lower 
cognitive abilities (Level I in Jensen's two-level theory of 
mental abilities). The IQ differences that Jensen is 
specifically concerned with involve abstract reasoning. MacLean 
usefully isolated the specific area of the brain that is the 
seat of abstract reasoning, and we know for sure that that part 
of the brain, the neocortex, is present in all human brains. 
Given this basic biological data, we can assuredly reject 
Jensen's genetic hypothesis. But the measured differences in 
intelligence between black and white children do beg for 
explanation, and the explanation is in the difference between an 
essentially oral culture, on the one hand, and a fundamentally 
literate culture, on the other hand (see Scarr and Weinberg, 
1976). But let us try to define the issue at hand even more 
clearly. 
 
The author here understands intelligence to mean actual or 
developed intelligence, not potential. Potential intelligence is 
genetically transmitted (Starr and Weinberg, 1978) and 
distributed in accord with the dictates of the normal 
distribution curve, and potential intelligence develops 
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interactively within one's culture into actual or developed 
intelligence. The author accepts the validity and reliability of 
IQ tests as measures of developed intelligence. IQ tests in this 
sense can be regarded as truly valid (Jensen, 1979b, pp. 169-258 
and 297-365) and reliable (Jensen, 1979b, pp. 259-295), and as 
Jensen (1978, 1979a) suggested, when drawn from various measures 
of mental ability "g" is probably a valid and reliable measure 
of actual intelligence. Jensen's findings of differences in mean 
IQ scores between black and white youth do truly represent real 
differences in developed intelligence, but those differences are 
not attributable to genetic differences in brain structure. 
Those differences can be explained entirely in terms of culture, 
and through the proper pedagogy those differences can be 
eliminated probably within a generation. 
 
Level I in Jensen's two-level theory of mental development 
(Jensen and Figueroa, 1975) corresponds to what herein is 
described as primary oral thinking, while Level II corresponds 
to what herein is called literate thinking. In addition, these 
two levels of cognitive development flow from the more dominant 
(oral?) and less dominant (literate?) lobes of the brain (for an 
excellent review of the literature on the two lobes of the brain 
and an excellent discussion of the function of those two lobes 
with reference to writing, see Winterowd, 1979; also see 
Lenneberg, 1967). Moreover, what herein is described as the 
interactive development of cognitive ability proceeds through 
bicameral interplay of the two lobes of the brain (Jaynes, 
1976), but this bicameral interplay of necessity requires the 
interiorization of a concretely visualizable but abstract symbol 
system, as distinct from an acoustic symbol system. Furthermore, 
as Havelock (1963) presciently maintained, this visualizable 
symbol system is the intervening variable or what Vygotsky 
(1962, 1978) styled the "mediating" factor in cognitive 
development. That is, the visualizable symbol system catalyzes 
the interplay between the two lobes of the brain. Nevertheless, 
Jaynes aptly suggested a dialogically-based metaphor -- 
bicameral -- for the interaction of the two lobes of the brain, 
for this interaction seems to be rooted in an aural-oral deep 
structure in the sensorium of the brain (discussed below). The 
working of this deep structure can be called the law of 
responsion (Havelock, 1978, p. 338), which deep structure is the 
key to understanding the mnemonic propensity of the brain 
conditioned by a primary or residually oral culture (Yates, 
1966). 
 
Piaget (1968) and others have suggested that innate 
cognitive capacities develop through interaction with the 
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environment, and we might expect this to be true for the 
cognitive capacities associated with the intelligence of each of 
the three types of brain. Ostensibly the capacity for abstract 
reasoning is developed through the interactive processes of 
learning the language of abstract reasoning (as distinct from 
the language of oral-formulaic thinking) and most explicitly 
through formal education (from educare, to lead out). The 
problem is that many black Americans and other folks from 
heavily oral cultures have not had appropriate opportunities to 
a sufficient degree yet to have developed their capacities for 
abstract reasoning to a very great extent. In effect some 
individuals have simply gotten ahead of other individuals in 
developing their capacities for abstract reasoning, but over the 
generations these differences can be made up through appropriate 
education. With time and effort, the normal distribution curves 
for all groups on measures of abstract reasoning can come to 
have comparable means, rather than having means that are a 
standard deviation or so apart. 
 
The study of manifested intelligence should be evolutionary 
both in terms of biological and historical evolution. Cultures 
have evolved from using oral-aural communication primarily to 
adding literate communication, and abstract reasoning 
specifically is related to the development of literate 
communication. The relative lack of success of functionally oral 
persons in twentieth-century Western schools probably indicates 
simply that the pedagogy of contemporary literate culture is not 
particularly effective for teaching literate thinking to 
children from a heavily oral culture. But an effective pedagogy 
can be implemented to overcome those differences, as is 
described below. 
 
Orality and Thinking 
 
Human cognitive structures develop in a particular manner 
as persons learn to read and write, and cognitive capacities are 
transformed to the extent that persons interiorize the processes 
involved in reading and writing. The consequent literate modes 
of thinking are characteristically more abstract and conceptual 
than the exclusively oral modes of thinking that they assimilate 
and supersede. But some children are better prepared than others 
by their specific backgrounds to acquire reading and writing and 
literate modes of thinking at an early age. On the other hand, 
many black American children specifically come from a background 
that is largely oral in tradition. Arthur L. Smith (1972) 
observed that Afro-American leaders have quite literally been 
spokesmen -- and the author would add, spokeswomen -- and he 
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noted that black Americans are essentially an oral people much 
like their African ancestors. Pascual Gisbert, S.J., (1967) 
rightly characterizes African people as Preliterate man, 
although if one wishes not to put the cart before the horse, it 
would be more accurate to speak of primary oral man. Ruth 
Finnegan's (1970) work has recently accentuated the oral 
traditions in Africa, and Jeff Opland (1975) has brilliantly 
called attention to the oral composing processes of African 
poets in one tribal tradition (also see Farrell's [1976b, p. 13] 
discussion of Opland). In a similar manner, Bruce Jackson (1974) 
has called attention to the oral traditions of black Americans 
by recording and transcribing instances of oral narrative 
poetry, and in a more specialized vein, Bruce A. Rosenberg 
(1970) has brilliantly demonstrated that many black folk 
preachers compose their sermons formulaically, in accord with 
the description of oral composing developed by Parry (1971) and 
Lord (1960) in the 1930's. (For related studies of orality, see 
Stolz & Shannon, 1976; Watts, 1969; Nagler, 1974; Peabody, 1975; 
Zwettler, 1978.) Moreover, black youth in ghettos in the USA 
have oral culture singing in their ears, ringing in their heads, 
as they jive, rap, shuck, testify, toast, and play the dozens. 
Most white youth, by comparison, come from a cultural background 
that is much more literate -- and deprived of those various 
verbal games that accentuate sound effects.  
 
While some people might be inclined to look on a primary 
oral culture in Africa or elsewhere as being limited, it is 
usually self-sufficient, and primary oral people are not aware 
of their so-called limitations. As Farrell (1977a, p. 449) 
noted, Janheinz Jahn (1961, p. 122) reported that some 
contemporary Africans who have recently encountered European 
culture make the distinction between "the intelligence of books" 
and their concept of intelligence which means the wisdom of 
life. He mentioned the story of an old Ruandese woman who cannot 
read and write. In conversation she will say with the most 
complete conviction: 
 
"White men are really disarmingly naive! They have no 
intelligence." Dare to reply: "How can you say 
something so stupid? Have you been able, like them, to 
invent so many marvels that exceed our imagination?"; 
and she will reply with a pitying smile: "Listen, my 
child! They have learned all that, but they have no 
intelligence! They understand nothing!" (pp. 122-123)  
 
The Africans about whom Jahn wrote clearly had an awareness of 
general intelligence, just as the ancient Greeks did (remember 
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"wily Odysseus" and "wise Nestor"). However, "the intelligence 
of books" does seem to represent a mode of thinking that is not 
characteristic of primary oral persons. To get a good taste of 
primary oral wisdom, see Patrick Paul Essien's (1978) study of 
the formulary expressions of the Annang tribe of the South-East 
State in Nigeria. To get a good sense of the good sense of the 
proverbs of the Ibo in Nigeria, see Chinua Achebe's Things Fall 
Apart and No Longer at Ease as well as his later novels. 
(Farrell [1978a, pp. 45-46] described how fascinated 
disadvantaged black -- and white -- students were in discussing 
the meaning of the proverbs in the two Achebe novels. For a 
somewhat different but not incompatible approach to the 
pedagogical use of proverbs, see D'Angelo [1977b]). There is 
much to be learned from the wise ways of primary oral Africans, 
as Thomas Adeoye Lambo (1978) suggested (for a related 
historical study, see Lain Entralgo, 1970), and from the wise 
humor of other oral peoples, as Idries Shah (1978) suggested. 
Even so, there is also much to be learned from the rich treasury 
of thought in the literate tradition of Western civilization. 
 
The Africans brought to this country as slaves were taken 
from a primary oral culture, and in this country they were 
excluded at times by law and at other times by custom from the 
literate culture fostered by reading and writing. The tradition 
of literacy among blacks in this country is therefore only a 
relatively recent phenomenon, especially in terms of broad-based 
literacy, and Smith's observations suggest that the literate 
tradition may not yet be the dominant tradition in black 
American culture. Most rural and lower-class urban blacks live 
in what might aptly be regarded as a residual form of a primary 
oral culture (or subculture). While many of them have mastered 
the rudiments of reading and writing, they have not interiorized 
literate modes of thinking to the extent that most middle-class 
whites have; they are heavily oral people still, and orality 
works against interiorizing literate modes of thinking, as 
described below. Children brought up in a residually oral 
culture probably will get lower IQ scores than children brought 
up in a more literate milieu, because the conceptual and 
abstract reasoning being tested in IQ tests that concern Jensen 
(and others) are concomitants of literacy and the 
interiorization of literate modes of thinking. Since a much 
larger percentage of black than white children grow up in a 
residually oral culture, it appears reasonable to expect the 
mean IQ scores of blacks to be lower than the mean IQ scores of 
whites. The bulk of this paper is devoted to explaining how and 
why that would be a reasonable expectation. 
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Symbolic Interaction 
 
It appears that thinking processes unfold as innate 
cognitive structures interact with learned structures. As 
Chomsky (1972) and others have suggested, the human brain may be 
innately predisposed to acquiring language, a major structuring 
system, and what they call the "deep structures" of language may 
also be innate. Even the limited number of phonemes in any given 
language may be related to some innate structuring. But the 
particular language acquired is learned, and each language 
offers a unique opening to reality, as Sapir (1921) and Whorf 
(1956) suggested. As James Britton (1970) noted, "languages 
differ from each other in the way they divide objects into 
categories," and it is largely through language categories that 
we interiorize our experiences. The general function of language 
is to give people various ways of organizing and coping with the 
reality they encounter, and language thereby increases human 
control over self, others, and the surrounding world. Children 
grow in the variety of ways they can relate to the world around 
them as they acquire and develop language (Piaget, 1959). 
"Language enables us to interpret and organize the world we 
experience through our senses, and in that way it provides 
structure and meaning to what would otherwise be a jumble of 
impressions" (Miller & Swift, 1976, p. 137). When children learn 
reading and writing and arithmetic in school, they add further 
abstracting/structuring processes already acquired through 
learning language. Oral language is a learned symbolizing 
structure that enables certain thinking processes to unfold, and 
the more abstract symbolizing involved in literacy adds yet 
another dimension to the interactive unfolding of thinking 
capacities within human beings. 
 
Farrell (1977a, pp. 444-445) described the complex 
interactive process of interiorizing and exteriorizing symbols 
in detail, and it is worth quoting at length here: 
 
To begin to understand how language works, it is 
important to acknowledge the obvious first of all: we 
do not have the real world, the physical environment, 
in our heads. We have only images of the world in our 
heads. Because they are not the real thing, these 
images are called symbols; they only stand for the 
real thing. We get these images through sensing, and 
fundamentally this is an abstracting process. In order 
to stay alive all animals must interact with the 
physical environment, and we use our images, our 
symbols, to guide our interaction with the world and 
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to enable us to gain some control over our 
environment. 
But humans have gone further than other animals 
in developing symbols to control the world. As 
mentioned, the human brain seems to have an innate 
predisposition to acquire spoken language. The spoken 
words are sound symbols; they stand for sensory 
impressions we have of the world around us. There is 
no necessary connection between these impressions (or 
images) and the sound symbols -- that is why we get 
different sounds for the same thing in the various 
languages. Spoken words, then, are symbols of symbols, 
the product of a complex abstracting process. 
Communication through talk is a symbolic interaction, 
a back and forth exchange of symbolic utterances, and 
these symbolic representations mark the coordinates of 
life in society (Berger &. Luckmann, 1966). 
We do not know exactly when people started 
talking, but we do know it has been going on for 
thousands of years. The point of talk is to help 
continue life. By talking we can gain greater control 
of our lives by manipulating symbols and then acting 
upon the world. We frequently talk before we act, and 
that talk is intended to move us, to persuade us to 
act in a certain way, to restructure our symbolic 
awareness of the world at the moment to get us to 
interact with that world so we can control it, can 
manipulate it better for our purposes.   
Words can also be used to entertain. We extend 
our play impulses beyond physical contests and dancing 
to singing and storytelling partly because we like the 
sounds. We also play around with sound effects -- such 
as rhythm, rhyme, alliteration -- to make our 
communication more enchanting to listen to and thus 
more effective. 
The language situation started to take on a new 
complexity around 3,500 B.C. when humans developed 
script, picture writing. These scratches or markings 
were intended to be pictures of the images people had 
in their heads of things in the world. I say "intended 
to be" to stress that these markings were symbols. 
They were imagistic visual symbols: They were visual 
symbols of images which were symbols of reality.  
Script enabled humans to manipulate reality a little 
more. They could interact with these symbolic 
markings, and that eventually gave them more to talk 
about. Then around 1,500 B.C. humans came up with the 
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phonetic alphabet. This was a series of markings or 
letters that were not pictures, although they may have 
evolved from pictures. These new abstract visual 
symbols had no necessary connection with whatever 
sound symbols they represented. People used the 
letters to stand for spoken words, which in turn stood 
for images. Written words then are symbols of symbols 
of symbols, the product of an ever more complex 
abstracting process.   
People could manipulate the new alphabetic 
symbols and do more than they had been able to do with 
the old picture symbols. The new letters were more 
versatile, but because they were such abstractions -- 
three times removed (abstracted) from the real world  
-- they required a gradual major change in cognitive 
processes, a change that was more pronounced than the 
previous change involved in learning picture-writing. 
The difference involved the kind and degree of 
abstracting necessitated by the letters that had not 
been necessitated by the imagistic pictures. Moreover, 
writing requires another form of abstracting inasmuch 
as we select or extract precisely what we want to say 
from a myriad of possibilities and arrange our 
selections in some intelligible order. [For empirical 
research in support of this, see Jensen and Figueroa 
(1975). Level II of cognitive development in Jensen's 
two-level theory of mental development is ineluctably 
connected with symbol manipulation.] The degree to 
which people become really good at manipulating 
alphabetic symbols Marshall McLuhan (1962) refers to 
as interiorization, taking in and making the symbols 
part of themselves. The process of interiorizing takes 
place over time, and it involves the ongoing interplay 
of all these symbolizing processes on and over and 
against and within one another. 
 
Reading and writing are based on cumulative abstracting 
processes and the cognitive restructurings that reading and 
writing enable develop the higher reasoning processes involved 
in extended abstract thinking, the very processes with which 
Professor Jensen is concerned. 
 
Ong (1967b, 1971) characterized cultures on the basis of 
the arrangement of communications media which predominate in 
them. When a culture moves from primary orality (with no reading 
and writing whatsoever) to literacy, it goes through an extended 
period that Ong characterized as residually oral before literate 
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modes of thinking are fully interiorized.  When the author in 
this paper refers to persons as residually oral, the author 
means that they come from a cultural background in which 
literacy and literate (i.e., analytic, abstract, detached, 
detailed, scientific) modes of thinking do not predominate. 
Thus, while the rudiments of reading and writing are present in 
most people from such a cultural background within the USA, oral 
forms of communication and the habits of thinking fostered by 
orality predominate in them. (When previously available modes of 
thinking are adapted gradually to new contexts, the author 
refers to this adaptation as a transformation, and such 
transformations represent what the author then refers to as new 
modes of thinking because they are different from the old 
modes.) 
 
Persons in a residually oral culture think differently from 
persons in a literate culture but not in an antithetical way 
(for specific examples, see Luria, 1976). That is, the 
characteristics of each type of thinking are not direct 
opposites. For instance, while the thinking of heavily oral 
persons is generally more concrete than abstract, abstractions 
occur in their talking and writing both in the form of 
generalized statements and in the form of a certain number of 
abstract concepts, such as love, justice, etc.  Persons who grow 
up in a more literate milieu, on the other hand, have generally 
already mastered at a fairly early age the detached, analytic 
form of thinking that is characteristic of literacy. They may 
have a lot to learn yet to be effective writers and efficient 
readers, but they have already developed literate modes of 
thinking fairly well compared to their peers from residually 
oral backgrounds. 
 
Historical Development 
 
Ong (1958, 1962, 1967a, 1967b, 1971, 1977, 1978) concluded 
that the modes of thinking fostered by reading and writing 
affect how people communicate, what they communicate, what they 
think is involved in communicating, and what they think is 
involved in thinking. These subtle shifts in modes of thinking 
constitute modifications of the basic modes of thinking 
originally unfolded in oral-aural communication. (Olson's [1977] 
consideration of the different senses of meaning in "utterances" 
and in "texts" is pertinent to some of the distinctions made by 
Ong and others between oral and literate thinking.) Ong's 
findings can help us understand the effects of the shift from 
orality to literacy in youth today and can perhaps shed some 
light on why black children do not score as highly as white 
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children on measures of abstract reasoning that are built into 
the IQ tests of which Jensen wrote. The relationship of 
historical developments and personal development today, however, 
is not a matter of one-to-one correspondences but, rather, of 
similarities. 
 
Oral communication unfolds through the uttering or outering 
of something from within ourselves. The terms interior, 
interiorizing, and interiority are fundamental to Ong's 
analysis. He defined interiority as "precisely the opposite of 
surface, that which does not have surface at all, and can never 
have" (1962, p. 29). But only persons with some form of language 
ever become fully aware of their interiority. Persons who do not 
(in one way or another) learn some symbolic, expressive language 
remain imbeciles, according to Ong, because they are unable to 
enter fully into themselves. It is through symbolic language 
that persons discover and renew their discovery that they are 
persons, that they have interiority. All verbalization (oral and 
written) is a cry, according to Ong -- a cry testifying to the 
presence of an interior reality. "True interiority," Ong 
concluded, "makes it possible to address others: only insofar as 
a person has interior resources, insofar as he [or she] 
experiences his [or her] full self, can he [or she] also relate 
to others, for addressing or relating to them involves him [or 
her] precisely in interiority, too, since they are interiors" 
(1967b, p. 124). Humans are interiors exteriorizing themselves 
through symbolic expression, without ceasing to be interiors.  
Moreover, humans interiorize -- take in and make their own -- 
sensory data from the real world as symbolic images, in addition 
to assimilating the overtly symbolic expressions exteriorized by 
other human beings. Thus symbolic interaction can enhance one's 
interior resources. But one's symbolic interaction with another 
person's interiority is mediated by exterior phenomena which can 
facilitate or limit interaction between persons depending on the 
participants' ability to tune into and properly understand the 
symbol systems that each person is using. The human voice is the 
most obvious mediator in symbolic interaction, although body 
language or writing or print, among other exterior phenomena, 
can and do serve this mediating function to varying degrees at 
various times in different forms of symbolic interaction 
(concerning "mediation," see Vygotsky, 1978). Moreover, to 
formulate anything interiorly is to process it for symbolic 
exteriorizing, and this unavoidably involves abstracting and 
structuring in some form. 
 
The kind of structure produced by the interior varies, most 
notably between oral and literate cultures but also within each 
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culture. Ong attributed this variance to the shifting 
organization of the human sensorium. "By sensorium we mean here 
the entire sensory apparatus as an operational complex ... the 
organization of which is in part determined by culture while at 
the same time it makes culture" (1967b, p. 6). The sensorium of 
infants is relatively undeveloped, undifferentiated, but infants 
gradually learn to attend to certain types of perception more 
than others. This learning is shaped by other persons and by the 
culture at large. The acoustic, rhythmic qualities of speech 
which were highly valued in oral culture would be an example of 
the result of the selective learning encouraged by a particular 
type of culture. As a consequence of the acoustic-rhythmic 
orientation of the oral-aural sensorium, information was 
structured so as to capitalize on sound effects, as described 
below. By comparison, the sensorium of persons in a literate 
culture is not as tuned-in to sound symbols as to visual 
symbols. This fundamentally different sensorial orientation is 
related to the substantially different personality structures 
and interior resources of persons in heavily oral as distinct 
from highly literate cultures. (MacLean suggested that all the 
sensory systems feed into the hippocampal formation in the 
limbic system of the brain. If that is true, then the 
hippocampal formation functions as what Ong called the 
sensorium.) 
 
Some of Ong's general observations about primary orality 
help establish a context for describing the historical 
development of communications media: 
 
The psyche in a culture innocent of writing knows by a 
kind of empathetic identification of knower and known, 
in which the object of knowledge and the total being 
of the knower enter into a kind of fusion, in a way 
which literate cultures would typically find 
unsatisfyingly vague and garbled and somehow too 
intense and participatory. To personalities shaped by 
literacy, oral folk often appear curiously 
unprogrammed, not set off against their physical 
environment, given simply to soaking up existence, 
unresponsive to abstract demands such as a 'job' that 
entails commitment to routines organized in accordance 
with abstract clock time (as against human, or lived, 
'felt,' duration). (1977, p. 18)  
 
Using a term from Levi-Strauss (1966), Ong (1977, p. 18) noted 
that primary oral persons "totalize" experience, which the very 
young also do (Bettelheim, 1976). But more to our present 
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purpose, Ong succinctly summarized the historical transformation 
of verbal performance from oral to written forms, as follows: 
 
Speaker and audience and subject matter are raveled 
together in a kind of whole [in oral performance]. ... 
[Then] the first age of writing is the age of scribes, 
writers of more or less orally conceived discourse. 
The author addresses himself [or herself] to imagined 
listeners at an imagined oral performance of his [or 
hers], which is simply transcribed onto a writing 
surface. The next age, arrived at gradually of course, 
is the age of true authors, in today's ordinary sense 
of author, a person who composes in writing and, 
later, for print. ... As compared to the scribe, the 
author no longer imagines recitation or direct oral 
address at all, but only the transaction with the 
paper and the putative, always absent, reader in 
whatever role this reader can be cast. Although oral 
residue persists in patterns of thought and expression 
not only for millennia after writing but also for 
centuries even after the invention of letter-press 
alphabetic print, the new literary, authorial patterns 
would pretty definitively have won out by the end of 
the eighteenth century. (1977, p. 282) 
 
Developing from scribes to true authors on a personal level 
is more demanding psychologically for residually oral persons as 
they grow older than it was for children who grew up in a more 
literate environment, and Ong commented sensitively on this 
situation: 
 
Those reared in a highly literate culture, where 
literate habits of thought are acquired shortly after 
infancy, commonly have little if any memory of entry 
into writing as a cutting loose from oral thought 
processes, as a kind of death. For those dominated 
through adolescence by the functional orality of 
subcultures in our American cities or some of our 
rural districts, the situation is quite different. 
They feel writing as a threat, a destruction of their 
psychic world, however desirable writing may be. 
Without proper encouragement to enter into this death, 
persons from such subcultures grow into adulthood 
without entering into, much less mastering, the 
analytic thinking processes which can be interiorized 
only by grappling with the written word. (1977, pp. 
257-258) 
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To understand how oral or literate backgrounds may be 
influencing children's performance on IQ tests, it is important 
to note here that Ong said that children who grow up in a highly 
literate milieu acquire literate habits of thinking shortly 
after infancy (for seemingly unwitting documentation of this, 
see Bruner, 1978). However, as mentioned, there seems to be an 
affinity in the initial thinking of the very young and primary 
oral persons, irrespective of whether the children's milieu is 
oral or literate. The initial acquiring of literate habits of 
thinking seems to be the result of growing up around literate 
persons: it begins before one begins to learn to read and write. 
Of course, learning to read and write -- and especially becoming 
efficient readers and effective writers, eventually -- involves 
a greater and gradual interiorizing of literate habits of 
thinking. 
 
The Greek Experience 
 
The ancient Greek experience of moving from orality to 
literacy is pertinent to Ong's observations. Professor Havelock 
(1963, 1966a, 1966b, 1971, 1976, 1977) analyzed the oral 
transmission of culture and the beginning of literacy in ancient 
Greece. In a primary oral culture, he noted, information is 
stored through preserved speech and retrieved through recall or 
memory. Preserved speech is rhythmic and metrical, thus 
facilitating memory. Assonance, alliteration and the like, 
parallelism, antithesis, repetition, and the simpler figures of 
speech, all contribute to the acoustic effect and hence the 
memorability of preserved speech. Moreover, this speech of 
memorialization is concerned with happenings, doings, behaviors, 
actions, graphic images of concrete situations, not with 
abstract ideas. The memorable also becomes the predictable, the 
expected, the familiar. This form of speech is used for didactic 
purposes, as in "sayings" or more notably in epic tales. The 
epics are composed orally by singers of tales, like Homer. These 
men have huge stores of metrical formulas in their memories, and 
they use these formulas to spontaneously compose narratives on 
the traditional themes that they and everyone else have heard 
many times before. In Havelock's view, the Homeric poems served 
as tribal encyclopedias, from which everyone in the culture 
learned the ways of the culture as they listened to and 
remembered portions of the stories or refreshed their memories 
of them. Moreover, the language of preserved speech of pre-
literate Greek culture did not allow, Havelock discovered, the 
development of abstract ideas. (Yates [1966] has documented how 
mnemonic aids were used to develop the "art" of memory from 
Greek and Latin antiquity through the seventeenth century.) 
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Around 700 B.C., the Greek alphabet was invented, and 
according to Havelock it encouraged the production of unfamiliar 
statements and stimulated the possibility of novel thinking, and 
particularly the capacity for abstract analysis. He detected in 
the pre-Socratics (specifically, Xenophanes, Heraclitus, and 
Parmenides) the subtle but purposeful changes in the language, 
from the heavily concretized language of preserved speech to 
something more novel and flexible and potentially more abstract. 
But the unfolding of the new abstracting processes of literacy 
came slowly. Literacy fostered the detached manipulation of 
symbols and the impersonal use of symbols in reasoning 
processes. Havelock noted that the manipulation of numerals in 
arithmetical processes advanced faster than the manipulation of 
letters because the numerals stood for something visual, whereas 
the Greek letters stood for something more elusive, something 
acoustic. The Greeks went through a period of craft literacy, as 
he characterized it, before achieving social literacy, wherein a 
large number of the people could read. Jensen and Figueroa's 
(1975) research clearly demonstrated that the ability to 
manipulate symbolic representations is linked with the 
development of higher cognitive skills (Level II in Jensen's two 
level theory of intelligence), and Jensen's empirical findings 
therefore confirm Havelock's inferences based on the analysis of 
historical philological phenomena (for related data, see Luria, 
1978). In addition Judith A. Hall and others (1978) reported 
that a visualizable and interpretable symbol system is related 
to IQ (for a related study, see Birdwhistell, 1952), although 
they were not referring to the kind of abstract symbol system 
referred to by Havelock and Jensen and Figueroa. 
 
Havelock claimed that the oral cast of mind constituted the 
chief obstacle to the abstract classification of experience, to 
the arrangement of cause and effect, to the use of analysis, and 
to scientific rationalism. The oral person was involved and 
committed to a given (perhaps "received" would be more accurate) 
position on matters, whereas the fully literate person, 
precisely because of being literate, was capable of being 
detached and looking at matters from different points of view. 
Highly literate persons can examine experience and rearrange it, 
can separate themselves from their experiences instead of just 
empathetically identifying with them, can stand apart from the 
"object" and reconsider it and analyze it and evaluate it. A. R. 
Luria's (1976) recently published study of cognitive development 
in oral and minimally literate persons in Uzbekistan and 
Kirghizia (conducted in 1931 and 1932, before the Soviet 
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literacy program had fully encompassed those remote areas) 
supported Havelock's claims. 
 
The oral tradition according to Havelock did not analyze 
history in terms of cause and effect, of factors and forces, of 
objectives and influences and the like because these analytical 
processes were not amenable to the psychodynamics of the 
memorizing processes upon which oral composing is based. 
Moreover, oral discourse in a predominantly oral culture did not 
engage in abstraction because totally oral people could not see 
or hear or taste categories, classes, relationships, principles, 
or axioms. Oral discourse was attentive to the sensual (the 
concrete) and was more disposed to describing actions than to 
creating abstractions. 
 
James A. Notopoulos (1949) characterized oral composing in 
archaic Greek literature as paratactic, inorganic, flexible, 
responsive to the live audience, digressive, and more concerned 
with the parts than with the whole. By comparison, written 
composing was hypotactic, organic, logical, and concerned with 
relating parts to one another to achieve a unified whole. 
Moreover, Notopoulos' observations coincide with those of M. L. 
West (1966). In commenting on the "somewhat illogical" sequence 
of thought in lines 94-97 of Hesiod's Theogony, West noted that 
"a series of thoughts ABC, where A and B or B and C make a 
coherent sequence, but ABC taken as a whole seems to lack all 
cohesion, is characteristic of archaic Greek literature" (p. 
186). This aspect of parataxis is also characteristic of the 
writing of residually oral persons today. 
 
"Parataxis," Notopoulos (1949) said, "is first of all a 
state of mind" (p. 11), the primary oral state of mind as 
manifested in Homer and others, and he noted that it is "the 
regular form of thought and expression before the classical 
period in Greek culture" (p. 13), before the middle of the fifth 
century B.C. (The classical period corresponds with what 
Havelock called the period of social literacy, and it was during 
the pre-classical period that what Havelock called craft 
literacy developed.) In general parataxis is characteristic of 
orality, whereas hypotaxis characterizes literacy. However, 
Notopoulos detected the paratactic-inorganic tradition in the 
writings of the pre-Socratics. But he noted that the pre-
Socratics were instrumental in formulating concepts that were 
basic to the later development of ideas about organic unity, and 
Havelock's observations about the changes in language which the 
pre-Socratics gradually made can be interpreted as changes away 
from paratactic structures and toward hypotactic structures, 
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even though Havelock did not put it in those terms. The pre-
Socratics, then, represent a transitional stage between primary 
orality and full literacy, which stage corresponds to what Ong 
calls residual orality and the age of the scribes. Residually 
oral persons today, like the pre-Socratics, are somewhere 
between paratactic and hypotactic language structures. (This 
summary of Havelock's work is only slightly adapted from the 
summary published by Farrell, 1978a, pp. 31-34.) 
 
The movement from parataxis to hypotaxis is, on the one 
hand, the movement from orality to literacy (Farrell, 1978a, 
1979a, 1979b) and, on the other hand, the movement from Level I 
to Level II in Jensen's two-level theory of cognitive 
development (Jensen and, Figueroa, 1975). Moreover, 
understanding the movement from parataxis to hypotaxis is 
essential to understanding what Chomsky (1972) and others called 
the "deep structure" of the brain. Parataxis is characterized by 
formulaic expressions (Parry, 1971; Lord, 1960; Rosenberg, 1970; 
Opland, 1975), and formulaic expressions are "kernel sentences" 
(Farrell, 1978a, pp. 47-50; 1979, pp. 12-14; implicitly, Essien, 
1978). Transforming, self-contained, (end-jambed) formulaic 
expressions from paratactic arrays of lines (one-liners, so to 
speak) into compound sentences (in effect) joined by 
coordinating conjunctions is a comparatively low-grade 
transformation, and it is well within the range of primary oral 
or Level I thinking to do this. The linguistic transformation of 
formulaic kernels (typically subject and verb, but with 
epithetic modifiers possible) into complex sentences with 
embedded subordination is what is meant here by hypotactic 
(sometimes more accurately referred to as syntactic) structure, 
and this sophisticated transformation is the mark of literate 
and Level II thinking. Moreover, the difference between the oral 
thinking of Level I and the literate thinking of Level II is the 
difference between appositional and propositional statements 
(Winterowd, 1979), which in turn are related to the two lobes of 
the brain. Cognitive psychologists and structuralists in 
linguistics and anthropology have yet to investigate these 
inter-relationships in detail. The structuralists start with 
exteriorized behavior and then infer the presence of certain 
deep structures in the brain, whereas this present paper starts 
with the brain (i.e., MacLean's work) and then describes on the 
basis of other work how the brain structures develop. The 
present work has two other sources of investigation under 
consideration concurrently. On the one hand, works by Parry 
(1971), Lord (1960), Rosenberg, (1970), Opland (1971), and other 
scholars like Havelock and Ong who have been leading the avant 
garde in scholarly investigation are strong sources of 
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information. On the other hand, perceptive field investigations 
by Hawkes (1967), Zoellner (1969), Radcliffe (1972), Minkoff 
(1974), Shaughnessy (1976, 1977), D'Eloia (1975, 1977), Gray 
(1975), Gray and Trillin, (1977), Laurence (1975), Krishna 
(1975), Halsted (1975), Desy (1976), Campbell and Meier (1976), 
Mills (1976), Petrie (1976), Pierog (1976), Samuels (1978), 
Nauer (1975), Collignon (1978), Rozek (1972), Farrell (1972, 
1978a), and many others provide the matrix for situating, 
applying, and amplifying the seminal research into orality and 
literacy. 
 
Sound Effects 
 
While memorized formulary expressions are the bedrock of 
communication in an oral culture, sound effects are instrumental 
in producing effective oral-aural communication. Gorgias (c.483-
c.376 B.C.) developed his famous symmetrical style of rhetoric 
in the predominantly oral culture of ancient Greece. He used the 
schemata verborum to make himself intelligible and enchanting to 
his oral-aural audience. The similar sounds, the symmetrical 
constructions, and the periodic rhythm all made it easier for 
the audience to feel and follow what was said. The parallelisms 
of the Psalms and the prophetic books of the Old Testament seem 
to have been motivated by the same necessity to be 
comprehensible by the oral-aural people in the audience. The 
school of Gorgias spread, and Isocrates (436-338 B.C.) seems to 
have been the most famous and influential practitioner of 
Gorgian style, even though he modified it. George Williamson 
(1951) detected a Gorgian-Isocratean influence in Cicero, 
Seneca, the Church Fathers, and practically everyone else who 
wrote educated Latin, even though most of the latter number of 
those people were clearly writing for literate readers rather 
than composing orally for a live audience of non-readers. (And 
John Lyly demonstrated his virtuosity with the schemata verborum 
in English in his highly popular Euphues and its sequel, which 
works were probably so popular because the oral reading of them 
in parlors would enable Renaissance women to inductively learn 
the verbal games in their mother tongue that educated men had 
learned as boys in studying Latin grammar and rhetoric.) 
Obviously the schemata had a compelling appeal to be able to 
attract so many Latin writers to use them over the centuries, 
and that appeal was probably based on the fact that they 
succeeded in enhancing communication even when they were not 
being used in a totally oral context. And this continued use of 
sound effects would be an instance of a scribal approach to 
writing. 
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In addition, Morris W. Croll (1966) reported that the 
schemata verborum were used in medieval and Renaissance popular 
sermons in the vernacular languages. The schematic style need 
not be attributed to a direct Gorgian-Isocratean influence, but 
it is reasonable to say that the preachers, like Gorgias and 
others before him no doubt, probably employed these techniques 
to better enable their audiences to feel and follow what was 
said. In a similar manner the metrical sound effects of the 
formulas studies by Parry (1971), Lord (1960), Rosenberg (1970), 
and Opland (1975) not only made the formulas easier for the 
performer to remember but also helped the audience follow along 
(and remember). The goal was to produce intelligible and 
enchanting communication that the audience would remember and 
would be moved by, and clever sound arrangements were essential 
for reaching this goal. When black children today use clever 
sound and word effects as they jive, rap, shuck, testify, toast, 
and play the dozens (some of which were described by Kochman, 
1972), they are continuing techniques of oral composing not 
unlike the schemata verborum. (The alternating exchange of 
bantering lines in the dozens is akin in style to stichomythia 
in drama, although the content of the lines exchanged in the 
dozens is much more stylized than in stichomythia because the 
dozens is clearly a game with relatively set rules.) (The last 
two paragraphs have been appropriated and slightly adapted from 
Farrell, 1977a, pp. 448-449.) 
 
Formulary Expressions 
 
In discussing the historical development of the verbal 
symbolic arts, Ong noted that they unfold in the sequence of 
narrative, rhetoric, and then logic. While he acknowledged that 
oral epic narratives are organized with consummate skill and a 
lot of conscious control, he nevertheless maintained that the 
oral epic tradition which produced Homer is largely not 
conscious of the organizational structures used in the oral 
narratives. (Bruno Bettelheim [1976, p. 216] also noted that 
"when a story exists only in oral tradition, it is largely the 
teller's unconscious that determines what story he [or she] 
relates, and what of it he [or she] remembers.") Conscious 
control comes with writing, but it grows out of the formulary 
tradition of oral composing. The formulary sayings of an oral 
culture -- such as, proverbs -- make it possible to 
conceptualize and manipulate sizable bodies of knowledge, and 
Ong claims that abstract thinking grows out of fixed formulary 
thinking by a process of liberation made possible through 
writing, which coincides with what Havelock said. It is 
rhetoric, however, not narrative, which schematizes what would 
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otherwise be too fantastic into identifiable figures of style 
and thus enables a movement away from the inductive learning of 
the "encyclopedic" oral epics to something more abstract and 
more consciously controlled. The process of abstracting some 
manageable "figures" of style, as they were called, from the 
myriad of impressions registering in human consciousness can be 
regarded as an extension and refinement of a process already 
underway in fairy tales and myths, as Bettelheim (1976, p. 75) 
described: "As he [or she] listens to the fairy tale, the child 
gets ideas about how he [or she] may create order out of the 
chaos which is his [or her] inner life. The fairy tale suggests 
not only isolating and separating the disparate and confusing 
aspects of the child's experience into opposites, but projecting 
these onto different figures." Rhetoric also commonly employed 
and projected polarities. 
 
Rhetoric is built on formulary expressions or commonplaces, 
which one stocks up in one's memory in order to insure copia, a 
fluent abundance, when one speaks. Ong distinguished between 
analytic and cumulative commonplaces as they were taught in 
Western rhetorical education for centuries. The analytic 
commonplaces include definition, genus, species, wholes, parts, 
adjacents, relatives, comparisons, opposites, and witnesses, and 
"for a person, one might, by a kind of analytic process, 
consider his [or her] family, descent, sex, age, education, and 
the like" (1977, p. 149). Ong characterized these as "concrete 
conceptualizations" (1958, p. 104), but they were certainly an 
advance over the structures used unconsciously to organize the 
oral narratives. The cumulative commonplaces or formulary 
expressions on the other hand, include the metrical formulas 
described by Parry (1971), Lord (1960), Rosenberg (1970), Nagler 
(1974), Opland (1975), Peabody (1975), Stolz & Shannon (1976), 
Zwettler (1978), as well as the non-metrical gnomic expressions 
known as proverbs, adages, maxims, apophthegms, sententiae, 
egigrams, even epithets, exempla, emblems, kennings, set 
phrases, and standard parallelisms and oppositions (e.g., 
Essien, 1978; also see the proverbs in Achebe's novels). 
Moreover, "primary oral cultures use [the cumulative 
commonplaces] as units somewhat as writing cultures use words as 
units," Ong notes. "This is one reason why such oral cultures 
are less 'analytic': their thought has to be kept in larger 
chunks to survive and to flourish" (Ong, 1977, p. 104). These 
sayings, however, transmit the wisdom of the ages, and one 
brings them to bear on present problems in order to determine 
the proper course of action. Of course, one must choose 
sagaciously from among the available store of commonplaces, and 
the consummate rhetorician is the one whose use of formulary 
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expressions warrants the praise that Alexander Pope succinctly 
formulated in the expression: "What oft was thought, but ne'er 
so well expressed." 
 
Of course, the highly literate person today regards these 
heavily formulary expressions negatively and labels them 
cliches, conveniently overlooking the fact that all of us make 
statements that are formulary to some degree. However, the 
systematic, self-conscious cultivation of both kinds of 
commonplaces in rhetoric historically represented a movement 
toward greater abstraction and control in the oral composing of 
narratives, and the prevalence of formulary or stock expressions 
in the talking and writing of residually oral persons today 
probably represents an analogous growth process for them. 
Moreover, once you formulate something and write it down, then 
you can modify it and add to it -- that's the kind of 
interactive process through which the abstract control of 
knowledge grows. Ong puts it this way: "What is distinctive of 
the visualist development leading to our modern technological 
culture is that it learns to vocalize visual observation far 
more accurately and elaborately than primitive [people], by 
vocalizing it manages to intellectualize it, and by 
intellectualizing it comes to generate further specific visual 
observation, and so on" (1977, p. 129). But the graphic, 
imagistic language of formulary expressions tends nevertheless 
to be more typical (typed) and generalized than empirical and 
particularized, with reference to both historical examples and 
the thinking of residually oral persons today. 
 
Since rhetoric was regarded as the exercise of reason about 
probable causes and effects (as opposed to certainties), it is 
significant to note that this reasoning was built on 
commonplaces or heavily formulary expressions. Due to the nature 
of these expressions, reasoning in an oral culture is much more 
additive -- and hence somewhat repetitive -- than either 
inductive or deductive, and although abstractions in the form of 
generalizations exist, concrete images and action words are much 
more common than abstract terms, but the concreteness is 
frequently more rhetorical than empirical. Nevertheless Ong 
maintained that rhetoric was intermediate in the historical 
development of consciousness out of a magical-mythical state. 
(Even the thinking of modern youth is largely animistic until 
puberty.) The fluent, extended, and ordered use of language in 
rhetoric historically seems to have expanded thinking capacities 
and interior resources, and when the rhetoric was later written, 
the language was selected and mulled over in an even more 
deliberate manner that further enhances thinking and 
29 
 
consciousness. So copia or fluency was instrumental in the 
historical development of rhetoric, and rhetoric was central to 
the emergence of consciousness from a magical-mythical state. 
 
The practice of rhetoric existed historically before the 
"art" or study of rhetoric, which happened only after the 
invention of writing. And just as analysis and systematic 
organization of the practice of rhetoric depended on writing, so 
too did the analysis and systematic organization of reasoning. 
Ong noted that Aristotle generated logic, or the study of, or 
science of, reasoning, and this could not have been done without 
writing. Logic moves toward greater and greater explication, as 
typified by its stress on definition. Since definition usually 
proceeds negatively, by making clear what a thing is not, logic 
generally proceeds by setting up greater and greater antitheses. 
But rhetoric also proceeds by antithesis, by differentiating 
opposites, by accentuating the boundary between self (or group) 
and other (people and things). However, the antitheses in 
rhetoric are frequently general or global compared to the 
sharper, more specific antitheses employed in logic. (For 
instance, the dichotomies of the logic developed by Peter Ramus 
[1515-1572] are probably the most notable example of stress on 
division and distinctions in the history of logic. [Concerning 
Ramism, see Ong, 1958.] Therefore, Ramist logic is probably an 
instance of the new medium -- print -- reinforcing and 
strengthening something from the old -- orality -- for bipolar 
thinking or thinking in antitheses goes back ultimately to 
primary orality. Of course, bipolar thinking is also a stage in 
the cognitive development of children today, thus suggesting 
another link in our theory of recapitulation.) Logic thus 
represents a historical movement toward greater abstraction and 
analysis and more conscious control of knowledge. 
 
Although Ramist logic or method was developed during the 
Renaissance, Ong regarded the Renaissance as a residually oral 
culture because the educational practices of the day were those 
of old for training an orator, and the actual written composing 
processes as a result still strongly echoed the paratactic 
practices of oral composing processes, especially with reference 
to thematic (episodic) construction and the use of formulary 
expressions. Although the fifteenth century invention of the 
movable printing press laid the groundwork for the movement 
toward universal literacy within a given population and 
therefore also laid the groundwork for the widespread use of 
literate modes of thinking, it still took several generations to 
produce a consistent (written) prose style free of formulary 
expressions and other signs of oral residue. 
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According to Ong, literate people came to rely on writing 
and printed books to store their knowledge, not just on human 
memory of formulary expressions. In this way literate people 
freed the human mind for other things. Ong (1971) maintained 
that both romanticism and technology resulted from human noetic 
control over nature, a degree of control not possible in an oral 
situation. When vast supplies of knowledge are stored in readily 
retrievable form in a literate culture, then people are freed to 
use their minds to develop new technologies without fear of 
forgetting the old ones. (Oral people who relied on the living 
human memory could not allow the risk of continued 
experimentation for fear of losing what was known.) Literate 
people are also freed to celebrate what is romantically 
mysterious, different, original, strange, ineffable, 
inaccessible, and unknown because what is commonly known is 
safely stored in books. As individual persons today increase 
their noetic control they in a sense go through the stages of 
consciousness represented by the development of modern 
technology and romanticism, with its sundry variations. 
Moreover, these advanced stages of literate consciousness 
signify ever-increasing abstracting capabilities as manifested 
in noetic control, control wrought largely through symbolic 
interaction with the real world. 
 
Individual Development 
 
The sensory register of primitive hunters was acute -- it 
had to be for them to survive. But they could not vocalize very 
thoroughly what all they were registering through their sensory 
awareness. To begin to vocalize what one is sensing, one needs 
to abstract certain details out from the whole gestalt. One can 
begin to do this through the use of somewhat generalized 
formulary expressions, but eventually these need to be 
supplemented by more discreetly selected words that more fully 
approximate what one senses. Hearing and reading examples of how 
others achieve this difficult process of abstracting is a sound 
way to begin to develop one's own abstracting. Children thus 
learn adult thinking from sources in their cultural milieu, and 
the pedagogy for an oral approach to teaching literacy that 
William Craig Forrest of LeMoyne College has formulated is 
imminently attuned to this reality. 
 
In the late twenties and early thirties, Lev S. Vygotsky 
(1962), Luria's friend and mentor who prompted his (1976) study 
of literacy, was concerned with what happened when children 
learned to write. Vygotsky observed that a child's "linguistic 
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age" in writing always appeared to be several years behind the 
child's "linguistic age" in talking. He formulated his 
explanation of this phenomenon in terms of what he called the 
development of social speech, inner speech, and written speech. 
In social speech, Vygotsky noted that the meanings of words 
evolve historically from relatively concrete referents to 
gradually more abstract terms (a review of etymologies will bear 
him out on this), and he claimed (pp. 73 and 124) that word 
meanings in the thinking of children change as they develop, 
just as they changed historically. The young child grasps the 
word-object relationship so that the word is regarded more as a 
property of the object than as a symbol of it, and it is only 
with time that the young person eventually learns to abstract 
the word from the concrete referent and use it in a more 
generalized manner to refer to a class of objects. Because the 
adult's words function as more generalized abstractions, 
Vygotsky concluded, "the child's and the adult's words coincide 
in their referents but not in their meanings" (p. 73). Thus with 
reference to learning the more abstract meanings of words, 
children appear to go through something analogous to the history 
of those words in the respective languages. In other words, one 
seems to go through a period wherein one's language usage is 
characterized by "concrete conceptualizations" before one's 
language usage is transformed as one gradually develops more 
abstract concepts out of one's language through interacting with 
other language users. In a monumental philological study, 
Havelock (1978) traced the historical development of The Greek 
concept of justice from its shadow in Homer to its substance in 
Plato, and what Vygotsky discerned as the movement from concrete 
conceptualization to abstract thinking in children is but a 
telescoped and transformed recapitualization of the kind of 
movement described by Havelock as a gradual and incremental 
transformation over centuries from an oral and concrete sense of 
things to an abstract concept. Vygotsky (1962, 1978) referred to 
this learning through interacting as mediated learning and 
Havelock (1966a, 1977, 1978) has provided ample evidence that 
writing, as Vygotsky suspected, is the mediating factor in this 
complex process of cognitive development (also see Luria, 1976 
and 1978; and Jensen and Figueroa, 1975). 
 
In addition, Vygotsky claimed that "grammar develops before 
logic" in the child (p. 46). This is pertinent to the previous 
discussion of paratactic/hypotactic language structures and to 
the development of abstract thinking. Vygotsky said, "The child 
may operate with subordinate clauses, with words like because, 
if, when, and but, long before he [or she] really grasps causal, 
conditional, or temporal relations. He [or she] masters syntax 
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of speech before syntax of thought" (p. 46, his emphasis). He is 
in effect acknowledging that the "syntax of thought" involved in 
using hypotactic language structures is learned, and the 
previous discussion of the Greek experience of moving from 
parataxis to hypotaxis suggested that it is learned through 
learning to read and write. This in turn is in accord with 
Vygotsky's own observations concerning the abstracting involved 
in writing and the conceptual development that follows. 
Moreover, Vygotsky's observations suggest that logical relations 
are implied in the grammatical constructions but that they are 
used unconsciously for a period of time; only gradually does one 
learn to consciously use one's language to control the logical 
relationships implied by certain grammatical constructions that 
are possible in the language that one learns. 
 
In learning to write, Vygotsky noted, children must 
disengage themselves -- that is, abstract themselves -- from the 
sensory aspects of social (oral) speech and replace the 
auditory-kinesthetic aspects of words with visually apprehended 
images (symbols) of words. Vygotsky noted that it is the 
abstract quality of writing that makes it somewhat difficult to 
learn. In addition, he anticipated several observations that Ong 
(1977, pp. 53-81) later delineated in "The writer's audience is 
always a fiction." Here's how Vygotsky described the situation: 
 
Dialogue always presupposes in the partners sufficient 
knowledge of the subject to permit abbreviated speech 
and, under certain conditions, purely predicative 
sentences. It also presupposes that each person can 
see his [or her] partners, their facial expressions 
and gestures, and hear the tones of their voices. ...  
Communication in writing relies on the formal meanings 
of words and requires a much greater number of words 
than oral speech to convey the same idea. It is 
addressed to an absent person who rarely has in mind 
the same subject as the writer. Therefore it must be 
fully deployed; syntactic differentiation is at a 
maximum; and expressions are used that would seem 
unnatural in conversation. (pp. 142-143) 
Writing is also speech without an interlocutor, 
addressed to an absent or imaginary person or to no 
one in particular -- a situation new and strange to 
the child. ... In written speech, we are obliged to 
create the situation, to represent it to ourselves. 
This requires detachment [a form of abstracting] from 
the actual situation. (p. 99) 
33 
 
Moreover, Vygotsky described the children's oral composing in 
terms anticipating Ong's description of unconsciously structured 
oral narratives: 
 
Writing also requires deliberate analytical action on 
the part of the child. In speaking, he [or she] is 
hardly conscious of the sounds he [or she] pronounces 
and quite unconscious of the mental operations he [or 
she] performs. In writing, he [or she] must take 
cognizance of the sound structure of each word, 
dissect it, and reproduce it in alphabetical symbols, 
which he [or she] must have studied and memorized 
before. In the same deliberate way, he [or she] must 
put words in a certain sequence to form a sentence. 
Written language demands conscious work. (p. 99) 
 
As we have discussed, conscious work with language yields 
greater control of language and seems to produce a more selected 
and abstract use of language than what occurs in the purely 
spontaneous oral use of language. 
 
Vygotsky regarded puberty as the significant turning point 
in the development of the children's thinking, for at puberty 
children develop what he called genuine concepts, concepts free 
of animistic thinking (which corresponds roughly with Piaget's 
stage IV). Of course, puberty marks a turning inward of the self 
that is at least metaphorically related to the turning inward 
fostered by literacy. But, more significantly, children in 
Western schools have been interiorizing the symbols of literacy 
and literate thinking for several years by the time that they 
reach puberty. Puberty may very well mark a significant shift in 
the thinking of children in primary oral cultures as well as 
those in literate cultures, but it seems reasonable to expect 
that the degree to which persons have interiorized literacy will 
influence the development of their thinking, particularly with 
respect to abstracting. Although Vygotsky himself did not 
explicitly consider this, his observations concerning written 
speech as distinct from social (oral) speech suggest this 
possibility. Moreover, as Ong noted, the process of 
interiorizing literate modes of thinking actually begins in the 
pre-school years for children who grow up in a literate milieu. 
Thus the effects of growing up in a functionally oral or 
literate culture influence one's abstracting abilities from an 
early age onward. 
 
Vygotsky's observations about individual development 
suggest a rough parallel with the historical development of 
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abstract thinking, although he did not explicitly consider the 
variable of growing up in an oral or literate culture. However, 
he seems to have sensed the importance of such a cultural 
variable, as was suggested in the research he prompted Luria 
(1976) to undertake. As mentioned above, Luria's findings 
largely corroborated Havelock's observations, and the work of 
Vygotsky connects with Ong's observations as this summary has 
indicated. 
 
Conclusion and Curricular Recommendations 
 
The distinctions made here between oral and literate 
thinking probably account entirely for the difference in the 
mean IQ scores reported by Jensen and others, even though the 
magnitude of the difference in the mean scores of black and 
white children is great. The fact that a greater percentage of 
black than white children grow up in a functionally oral culture 
probably accounts entirely for their lower mean scores on 
measures of abstract and conceptual reasoning, but those 
differences can probably be overcome within a generation with 
the proper pedagogy in primary schools. The proper pedagogy is 
that which Professor Forrest has formulated, which he describes 
as an oral approach to teaching literacy (also see Brooks, 
1973). While the author thankfully acknowledges the influence of 
Professor Forrest on his thinking about pedagogy (see Farrell, 
1978a, pp. 45-47), he would like to here make a few general 
observations that could be of service to the readers in 
situating Professor Forrest's ideas in a larger context. 
 
In recent years some people in the USA have decried the 
teaching of standard English. To teach standard English as a 
matter of course is, they say, a violation of the students' 
right to their own language. When the students in question have 
been black, charges of racism have been bandied about, but all 
that sound and fury has signified nothing sensible. Unless it 
can be demonstrated that certain students are intellectually 
incapable of mastering the syntax of standard English, standard 
English is the only sensible standard for schools to establish 
for all students. For either we have one standard for all or we 
have a double standard. 
 
The goal of social integration will be best served by 
having one standard for all -- standard English. Mastering the 
syntax of standard English will enhance students' economic and 
social potentialities for the rest of their lives in our 
culture. Those students who speak/write a non-standard dialect 
need to be given the opportunity to become bidialectical through 
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instruction, for they are unlikely to become bidialectical as 
readily through their own uninstructed efforts. Therefore, all 
students in American schools should be instructed in the syntax 
of standard English as a matter of course in English courses 
(D'Eloia, 1975). 
 
People in this country who use non-standard forms of 
grammar are frequently judged to be uninstructed, and students 
need to be aware that such judgments are made at times by people 
in the real world. Moreover, they need to be told that such 
judgments can stand in one's way in terms of job opportunities 
and social mobility. While students are technically free to 
allow themselves to be judged as uncultured and uneducated 
because of their use of non-standard forms of English, they are 
also free to protect themselves from such judgments by learning 
the standard forms of grammar to the best of their ability. Of 
course, learning the standard grammar does not necessarily mean 
dispensing completely with one's native dialect, but it does 
mean becoming bidialectical. Moreover, there is nothing 
particularly unusual about being bidialectical, as Ong noted: 
 
Many Europeans, including highly educated Europeans, 
do not speak at home the way they speak in the 
schoolroom or on television. The dialect they speak at 
home is not a written language -- there is no fixed 
way even to spell it. Such dialects are like ghetto 
languages in the United States, which aren't normally 
written, although there is some attempt to write them 
now. There are signs that dialects in Europe and 
elsewhere are disappearing, largely under the 
influence of the mass media. This is too bad, but 
there is not much you can do about it, because people 
tend to standardize. What will happen of course is 
that many of the features of these smaller languages, 
especially vocabulary, will be incorporated into the 
larger languages. And you can make taped recordings of 
the disappearing dialects for later study. (Ong, 1973, 
p. 30) 
 
There is evidence that some of the vocabulary of non-standard 
dialects has been assimilated into standard English in recent 
years. However, the grammatical forms of standard English have 
remained largely unchanged despite recent attention to the 
grammatical forms of non-standard English. 
 
Students are students so that they can become educated and 
acculturated (Skurnick, 1977). One of the important functions of 
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education is to transmit the accepted customs of the culture. If 
the ability to talk and write in the grammar of standard English 
is a minimum criterion that one must meet in order to avoid 
being regarded as an uncultured, uneducated person, then 
students had better learn the grammar of standard English. Thus, 
bidialecticalism comes down to this: when in Rome, do as the 
Romans do; when at home, do as others at home do. If, as Ong 
says, this is what many Europeans do, then it is not a 
particularly extraordinary practice. As a matter of fact, a good 
number of people in the world have to be bilingual or even 
multilingual, not just bidialectical, in order to successfully 
negotiate the demands of their societies. Moreover, expanding 
one's facility with language has long been regarded as a very 
humanizing process, for the more conscious use of language 
enhances one's awareness. 
 
Of course, becoming bidialectical or bilingual is hard, but 
as Ong sagaciously points out, "You shouldn't study a subject 
just because it is hard, but on the other hand you shouldn't not 
study something just because it is hard" (p. 30). 
 
If expanding one's facility with language is hard, teaching 
language is also hard. Teaching the grammar of standard English 
to speakers of non-standard English is fraught with difficulty. 
A "crash course" in grammar usually does not do the trick. 
Learning the grammar of standard English is a matter of 
acculturation that simply requires time, but as Vygotsky (1962, 
p. 46) said, "grammar develops before logic." Children must 
learn the grammar of the schools before they will be in a 
position to master the logic of the school subjects. Moreover, 
the school subjects are the repository of the best thought that 
has been developed in Western culture. Opening students to the 
logic of the school subjects is tantamount to opening them to 
the cultural heritage of Western civilization. Furthermore, this 
opening up process is literally the development of potential 
intelligence into actual intelligence. (For a solid study of 
some of the problems connected with teaching grammar, 
punctuation, and spelling, see Shaughnessy, 1977.) 
 
To achieve this acculturation, teachers of English first of 
all have to engage the students in the process of reading and 
writing. The students need to read regularly so that they will 
get used to seeing the grammar of standard English. Oral reading 
can help them become more conscious yet of the grammar of 
standard English. Once the students are used to seeing the 
grammar of standard English in print, they are then in a 
position to recognize when the grammar of their own writing does 
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not conform to that of standard English. (For a closely related 
defense of teaching the other conventions of writing -- spelling 
and punctuation -- see Farrell, 1978b.) 
 
Of course, the students need to write regularly, and they 
also need to get in the habit of reading over their own writing 
carefully. Having them read their papers aloud occasionally is a 
good strategy for encouraging them to read their own writing 
carefully. Marking grammatical errors in papers is one way to 
call their attention to those errors, but what the students who 
write in non-standard grammar need to learn is how to "edit in" 
corrections. Although it is time-consuming, the only effective 
way that the author knows of to teach those students how to do 
that type of editing is to have tutors go over their papers in 
conferences. Even then, there seems to be an element of 
readiness in play which determines whether or not they will 
catch on. Once those students learn to "edit in" standard forms 
of grammar in their writing, they are then in a good position to 
proceed to consciously altering their speech so that they use 
the grammar of standard English when they talk. However, there 
are limits as to how far post-pubertal students who speak/write 
non-standard English seem to be able to carry this process of 
acculturation, and that is why it is imperative for the process 
to begin in the primary grades. (Concerning the limits of post-
pubertal language development, see Lenneberg [1967, p. 158] but 
also remember that Luria [1976] studied a post-pubertal 
population; also see Farrell 1977b.) 
 
Acculturating speakers of non-standard English to the 
grammar of standard English is a complex, time-consuming, hard 
process. While this process needs to be engaged in with certain 
college-age students, it probably should be begun early in 
primary school. However, the process needs to be engaged in 
sensitively with students of any age. The goal is 
bidialecticalism. That is, the goal is to get the students to 
learn the prestige dialect and to learn when it is appropriate 
to use that dialect, without giving them the sense that they 
should be embarrassed by their native dialect -- which would 
still be appropriate for them to use in certain contexts outside 
the worlds of school and work. 
 
Since it is frequently difficult for young children to 
understand and accept correction of their spontaneous speech 
patterns, pedagogical strategies for acculturating children to 
the grammar of standard English need to be sensitively employed 
to be effective. Two strategies recommend themselves: 1) 
memorizing and reciting written verse -- an old pedagogical 
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practice which can appeal to the young because of the rhythm and 
rhyme of verse; and 2) prepared (rehearsed) oral reading of 
prose texts which are suitable for primary school students. In 
both of these approaches, the presence of the written text would 
probably make it easier for the students to accept the authority 
of the teacher in correcting them. Moreover, both of these 
pedagogical practices would probably enhance the students' 
reading, which in turn would help them become better educated 
persons. However, these oral techniques would reach optimum 
efficacy only if proper enunciation were duly stressed in the 
primary grades, as Professor Havelock suggested in a letter to 
the author (personal correspondence dated December 7, 1978). 
Using English 2600 and English 3200 (Blumenthal, 1973; 1972) 
with the aid of cassette tapes of those texts would probably be 
the best way to teach enunciation, grammar, and usage to 
students who had already learned the rudiments of reading and 
writing. 
 
While the students do have a right to their own dialect, 
they also have a right to learn the dialect of educated 
speakers/writers of the language. The schools have been set up 
to transmit to students the best knowledge, thinking, and 
customs of the culture. To deny students the right to learn the 
dialect of the dominant culture is to abridge a basic function 
of the schools. Schools in the United States were instituted to 
expand people's freedom, not to restrict it. The way to expand 
people's freedom through instruction in English is to teach them 
to master the syntax of standard English in the primary grades. 
 
Despite the fact that acculturating students to standard 
English is hard work, it is, in part, the work that society is 
paying English teachers to do. Furthermore, as Vygotsky 
discerned, it is the key to developing potential intelligence 
into actual intelligence. A concerted effort to teach black 
children standard English coupled with a concerted effort to 
implement Professor Forrest's oral approach to teaching writing 
in the primary grades could be sufficient to close the IQ "gap" 
between black and white children that has been a concern of 
Professor Jensen and others for many years. 
 
While it is necessary first to get our bearings straight on 
our basic orientation in teaching literacy, it is also necessary 
to construct our pedagogy for literacy on solid empirical 
research. However, the people who allocate research money are 
for some inexplicable reason supporting work like Cole and 
Scribner (1975) rather than investing money in basic research 
that could make a big difference in whether or not the USA ever 
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realizes the goal of Jeffersonian democracy. And yet there may 
be hope for turning the situation around, for without fully 
realizing the implications of the truth of what he said, Rexford 
Brown (1978, p. 3) accurately noted that IQ tests are tests of 
reading, proofreading, editing, logic, and skills of prudential 
decision-making based on inferences drawn from what is given, 
drawn by asking and answering the reality-disclosing questions 
of what, why, how, who, when, and where. Nevertheless, there are 
already an abundance of fine, albeit usually low-budget, 
research studies available. Many formal empirical research 
studies reported in Research in the Teaching of English are 
pertinent to the concerns of the present paper. Some recent 
entries in Dissertation Abstracts International pertinent to the 
concerns of the present paper include Kemp (1979), Tang (1979), 
Baghban (1979), Heller (1979), North (1979), Cowardin (1978), 
Perl (1978), and Rinderer (1978). 
 
Some descriptive studies that the author found helpful in 
formulating this paper are Hawkes (1967), Zoellner (1969), 
Radcliffe (1972), which is an outline for an empirical test of 
Zoellner's ideas, Minkoff (1974), Nauer (1975), and Collignon 
(1978). Theoretical works of interest here would include 
Lunsford (1978) and D'Angelo (1978). D'Angelo (1977a) has 
compiled a very useful thematically organized bibliography of 
descriptive or theoretical works on various topics relevant to 
the pedagogy of writing (also see the bibliographic essays 
edited by Tate, 1976). Evaluation of that which is being tested 
is essential to any sound research design, and Arthur M. Cohen's 
(1969) trenchant directives on the evaluation of writing offer 
sound guidance for a valid and reliable research design (also 
see Miller, 1979). Of course, once the basics of how to evaluate 
the product per se have been worked out, then all the standard 
apparatus of research design and methodology are brought into 
play, which is the kind of thing that Jensen excels at. 
Unfortunately that kind of dazzling know-how has not been 
brought to bear yet on research in the teaching of reading and 
writing. But since cognitive development proceeds interactively 
with the development and interiorization of literacy, perhaps 
that kind of sophisticated research will be the new frontier of 
the eighties. (But remember intelligence-potential is 
distributed along the lines of the normal curve, and 
consequently so is intelligence-actual. With the proper pedagogy 
the mean IQ scores of black and white children can become 
isomorphic, probably within a generation, but there will be 
outside limits to each person's development [Cole, 1978; Cross, 
1980]. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that over time 
the distribution curve, and hence the mean score, of 
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intelligence-actual has moved forward, especially during the 
historical shift from orality to literacy within the given 
culture, and it is reasonable to assume that the distribution 
curve will continue to move forward incrementally over a period 
of generations, especially as we develop more and more effective 
pedagogy in reading and writing.) 
 
The outlines of a sound pedagogy can be briefly sketched 
here, but with sufficient references to enable the reader to 
find what he or she needs to know. Farrell (1977a) noted that 
black orality is primary orality and white orality is secondary 
orality, and he said with reference to college-age students that 
different pedagogical strategies would be needed, and Ong (1978, 
p. 4) agreed. But that was with reference to college-age youth. 
However, a single pedagogy for both black and white children of 
a young age could be extremely effective if it were tailor-made 
to fit the needs of primary oral students. (The converse is not 
true: an effective pedagogy for secondary oral students would 
not be particularly effective for the primary oral students, as 
the school system in the USA has manifestly demonstrated in its 
comparatively inefficacious teaching of primary oral students.) 
Following the principle of doing the greatest good for the 
greatest number, it would make sense then to institute a 
pedagogy that would be effective for both primary and secondary 
oral students to initiate them into literate ways of thinking. 
Of course, learning the rudiments of manipulating numerical and 
alphabetical symbol systems comes first in the pedagogy of 
literacy. Bruner (1978) has unwittingly shown how early the 
initiation to literacy begins for pre-school children in a 
secondary oral culture, whereas this is not the case for 
children in a primary oral culture. Nevertheless, pedagogy 
attuned to the learning styles of primary oral students would 
also be sound pedagogy for secondary oral students. Dr. Jean 
Houston, Director of The Foundation for Mind Research in Pomona, 
New York, has done excellent investigative explorations of the 
pedagogical use of rhythmic patterns to facilitate the learning 
of the rudiments of numerical and alphabetical symbol 
manipulation (personal correspondence dated July 2, 1977), and 
her pedagogical techniques should be emulated in early primary 
schooling. Havelock (1973, 1976) noted that historically the 
manipulation of numerical symbols in arithmetical processes 
advanced faster than the manipulation of alphabetical symbols 
because the numerals were concretely visualizable symbols, 
whereas the alphabetical symbols stood for something more 
elusive, something acoustic. Music (rhythm) and math are alike 
because we "count" in both of them, and there is rhythm in both 
counting systems. That is probably why the manipulation of 
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numerical symbols advanced faster than the manipulation of the 
letters of alphabetic symbols. However, rhythm is involved in 
the initial memorizing of the alphabet, but the subsequent 
manipulation of alphabetical symbols in making words does not 
involve rhythm as noticeably as the manipulation of numerical 
symbols in the memorization of the multiplication tables by 
rote. (And yet for primary oral students rhythm remains a large 
part of their interior composing process, and Farrell [1978a, 
pp. 49-50; 1979b, pp. 13-14] noted that they must eventually 
move away from such composing habits in order to go on to master 
hypotactic language structures. Nevertheless, it is prudent to 
exploit rhythm in teaching both primary and secondary oral 
students the rudiments of mathematical and alphabetical symbol 
manipulation.) 
 
Beyond the rudiments, Farrell (1979b) described four 
developmental groupings of students: the Homeric, Spenserian, 
Shakespearean, and Miltonic groups; he sketched pedagogical 
concerns for each group. (Although it is beyond the scope of the 
present paper to discuss in detail, it can be noted that what 
Farrell [1979a, 1980; also see 1979c] described as the female 
mode of rhetoric is something that the more sophisticated 
students might attempt once they have proven their stuff in the 
Miltonic group.) 
 
Recommendations for Government Action 
 
The President should introduce legislation to fund 
systematic efforts to implement through the Department of 
Education the insights offered by this report. 
 
Pre-school programs for ghetto black children should be 
instituted. The professional staff for these should be trained 
in the techniques of rhythmic pedagogy pioneered by Dr. Jean 
Houston. Those techniques should be employed to inculcate black 
children in arithmetical and alphabetical abstract symbol system 
manipulation. 
 
Primary and secondary school teachers in racially 
integrated or predominantly black ghetto schools should be 
trained to use orally/aurally/visually integrated pedagogy to 
teach all subjects that involve reading and writing, and money 
should be available to hire tutors. Farrell (1975, pp. 45-46) 
concluded that the students' measured reading level and the 
readability level of the texts are not significant factors, if 
the teachers effectively read the texts orally to the students 
and properly explicate what the texts say. Professors Alan Kraus 
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(1968; 1971) and Sol Rabushka confirmed Farrell's research-based 
analysis by using an oral-aural pedagogy to present texts like 
the Harvard report on general education and other sophisticated 
material to academically disadvantaged students, (i.e., the 
Homeric group) in the General Curriculum Division at Forest Park 
Community College. But this is only recent work. As Ong (1978, 
p. 1) pointed out, William Holmes McGuffey's Eclectic Readers 
were a big success in the nineteenth century even though the 
adroitly selected passages were probably beyond the readability 
level or the presumed reading-level of the prospective readers. 
Those Readers succeeded because they were oriented toward oral 
reading. They offered an orally/aurally/visually integrated 
pedagogy in literacy, and they would still be quite useful for 
the Homeric and Spenserian groups of students. 
 
Since language instruction in virtually all Western 
languages entails interiorization and manipulation of an 
alphabet descended from the Greek alphabet, non-native language 
programs probably should be instituted in primary schools. This 
should be done in primary schools because after puberty the 
capacity of the brain to absorb new language skills diminishes 
somewhat (Lenneberg, 1967, p. 158). Professor Rosemary Thomas of 
Forest Park designed an efficacious programed sequence of 
instruction in French using cassette tapes. The design she 
worked out for teaching French could be replicated with Greek, 
Latin, Spanish, Italian, German, and Russian for use in primary 
schools. (That design could also be adapted to teach 
enunciation, grammar, and usage in English to the Homeric and 
Spenserian groups by putting English 2600 and English 3200 
[Blumenthal, 1973; 1972] on cassette tapes.) 
 
The production and marketing of instructional materials 
should rightly be reserved for private enterprise. However, the 
government can make monies available for 1) purchasing 
instructional materials, 2) hiring the professional staff, 
including tutors, necessary to implement an efficacious 
educational system, and 3) instituting training programs for 
teachers and tutors. The government should financially aid 
school districts so that they can test out the pedagogy 
suggested here on a pilot basis, and the government should 
subsidize the research to properly measure and report the 
results of pilot projects. Perhaps a National Center for 
Literacy should be instituted along the lines described by 
Theodore L. Gross (1980, pp. 235-236) to coordinate the various 
pedagogical and research efforts that are needed. 
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The author helped Professor Thomas and a group of teachers 
in English, Spanish, speech, and reading plan the highly 
effective Language Insight Program at Forest Park, a twelve 
credit hour interdisciplinary team-taught package of language-
oriented courses for students generally in the Spenserian group. 
A comparably integrated approach to instruction in speech, 
reading, and writing in both English and a foreign language 
should be instituted in primary schools throughout the USA for 
students in the Homeric and Spenserian groups, especially in 
ghetto areas. However, it would require a nationally organized, 
federally supported effort to institute programs that integrated 
language instruction on the scale here envisioned. Perhaps a 
National Center for Language Instruction and Literacy, rather 
than just a National Center for Literacy, could be established 
as part of the Department of Education, with close ties with the 
National Institute for Education. A specific agency does seem to 
be called for to direct efforts to implement and test out and 
refine the various recommendations that have been made in this 
report. The preliminary tests carried out at Forest Park and 
other open admission colleges throughout the country provided 
sound indications to believe that much progress can be made in 
eliminating the mean IQ differences between black and white 
children within a generation, if an orally/aurally/visually 
integrated pedagogy is employed in language instruction, 
especially, and in all other areas of instruction where reading 
and writing are involved. 
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